We demonstrate that the dynamics of tax competitiveness in the EU has gained a new higher level. The shift in the tax competition can be noted after new countries have joined the EU. Both positive and negative effects of tax competitiveness are discussed in the paper and the question of trade-off between the strong tax competitiveness of a country and magnitude of its tax revenue is raised. Evaluation of chosen countries using multiple criteria decision aid methods (MCDA) shed more light on the opposition of two groups of countries, the old and new members of the EU, provided more details on the both the present state and dynamics of tax competitiveness in the. The evaluation methodology can be successfully used for monitoring the current state of tax competitiveness of each member country. Prominence of the multiple criteria evaluation TOPSIS method of MCDA evaluation is described.
Introduction
Tax competitiveness becomes vital in the global environment for each country in its competition for tax revenues. Tax base of a country directly depends on decision made by management of firms where to register their businesses (Parfenova, Pugachev & Podviezko, 2016; Podviezko, Parfenova & Pugachev, 2019) . In addition to the geographical factor, turnover attracted by a country indirectly increases tax revenues. Merika, Triantafyllou & Zombanakis. (2019) , for example, explain how carbon, tonnage, wage and tax competitiveness and tax uncertainty in Greece affect revenues from shipping via Greek ports. In Xie, Dai, Xie & Hong. (2018) and Liang, Wang & Xue. (2016) , it is shown how carbon tax alterations in the international scale at the international level decrease GDP and output in China. Taxes have direct or indirect effects on the important macroeconomic factors as GDP. And, even more obviously, both the magnitude of the budget and the budget to GDP ratio directly depend on tax revenues of a country.
We note that there is always a trade-off between tax harmonisation or tax competition. The former implies convergence of tax rates among competing countries, while the latter means reducing tax rates as well as improving business environment. Competition between countries becomes intense, especially, in the context of globalisation (Podviezko, 2016) . The EU can serve as a good pattern for investigation of such a trade-off between tax harmonisation and tax competition. In fact, the EU enjoys such common (harmonised) features as the free trade, the common currency in the majority of countries, similar standards of accountancy and common databases of major economic indicators, etc. In particular, in the Rome Treaty (1957) foundation of tax harmonisation was set; restrictions on the tax competition between participating countries were laid down. It was planned that the tax harmonisation will lead to creation of a common EU budget in the beginning of the 1980s. Nevertheless, the tax harmonisation process reverted to tax competition as a fulfilling factor of a desire of the EU members to retain some sovereignty. Thus, partly, the process of tax competition is currently taking place in the EU, while the legal foundation in the EU for tax harmonisation is prevailing. Tax competition is still vital for new member countries of the EU as a vital convergence factor of such countries. Currently, smaller tax rates in such countries attempt to create attractiveness of the countries for investors (Detken, Gaspar & Noblet, 2004) .
Such countries historically belonged either to the USSR, or to the block of socialist countries, their economies initially were in a rather poor shape. Consequently, the new members of the EU have to stay highly competitive, in particular, in terms of tax competitiveness, in order to meet the goal of convergence.
The aim of this paper is to analyse tax competitiveness within the EU and to test the hypothesis of tax harmonisation between new and old member countries.
Tasks of the research are as follows:
to draw out a set of criteria that describe tax competitiveness in quantitative terms; -to evaluate tax competitiveness within the countries of the EU; -to discern tax competitiveness of two groups, old and new members of the EU; -to analyse dynamics of the tax competitiveness in both new and old member countries of the EU While searching for the right balance between tax competition and tax harmonisation, we have to be aware about increasing tax risks. Vanishing tax revenues of a state usually go along with increase of tax competitiveness. Consequently, the fiscal budget of more tax competitive countries shrinks. Realisation of such risks is observed in the data of the general government spending to GDP available at the OECD site. In 2016, such ratio for the new members of the EU was as follows: 34.1% for Lithuania, 37.2% for Latvia, 39.5% for Estonia, 41.1% for Poland, while the average in the EU in 2005 -2016 . Along with the scarcer, tax revenue as a source of government spending is its volatility. Dynamics of the ratio of the general government spending to GDP of some EU-13 countries (The Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, The Slovak Republic, Estonia, Slovenia, Latvia and Lithuania) is shown in Figure 1 , where its deviation from the averages of corresponding countries in the period 2005-2016 is depicted. In the diagram, a high degree of volatility of the ratio with recent negative tendencies in Lithuania, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia, is observed. This means that financing sources for both re-distribution of wealth and positive externalities are gradually undermined, thus decreasing welfare, wealth of lower-skilled labour and preclude important factors to retain labour.
Figure 1. Volatility of Government spending to GDP ratio. Authors' calculations
This negative tendency is, especially, worrying in the countries with high emigration rates, which are high in the Eastern Europe (Atoyan et al., 2016) . Growth is driven by two factors of production, capital and labour. Reduced labour activity, consequently, hampers tax revenue, while relative growth of the older population in such countries increases demand for social spending (Clements, Dybczak, Gaspar, Gupta & Soto,. 2015) . Government spending is also important as a source of the social innovation (Kuklyte & Raisiene, 2015; Raisiene, 2015) , which considerably helps to stay competitive. Small magnitudes of the government spending reduce supply of positive externalities comparing to the old EU-members. This frightens away citizens and extends the vicious cycle of emigration from the new EU-13 member countries to the old member countries of EU-15.
The relationship between paid taxes paid and created externalities is not straightforward as there are possibilities of avoiding taxes by legal or illegal means (Benassy-Quere, Trannoy & Wolff. 2014). High tax rates do not necessarily imply higher tax revenues and a larger budget. The shadow economy is a problem in the new EU-member countries as they are at the bottom of the EU in this respect (Schneider, 2013; Tudose & Clipa, 2016; ) . As in the countries with high levels of the shadow economy higher tax rates, contrary, decrease tax revenues. This makes logical current decisions of the majority of governments of the new member countries to increase their tax competition by means of attractive tax rates. After joining the EU, the new members gained an additional impetus to modernise their tax collection systems and thus create a less favourable environment for tax evasion by imposing constraints on illegal activities (Remeur, 2015) .
In Figure 2 , dynamics of tax competition in the EU is illustrated in respect to the averages of the corporate income tax rates. We can observe the gradual decrease of the corporate income tax rates in the EU over the past two decades as the corporate tax rate decreased from 35% to 21.3%, by 13.7 p.p. in average. The rate of decrease was similar in two groups of countries, in EU-15 and EU-13. The former group had 13.8 p.p. decrease, while the latter has 13.5 p.p. decrease. Thus, on the pattern of dynamics of corporate tax rates, we observe the trend of rather sharp increase of tax competitiveness between members of the EU. However, it is also visible that the rates considerably differ between the groups. The diagram also reveals that in the period 2008-2018 the rates in the new member states of the EU stabilised while they were always smaller than the average of the EU. This illustrates a higher tax competitiveness of the new members of the EU in terms of the corporate income tax rates. It is interesting to observe dynamics of the difference of average corporate tax between the two groups. The gap initially grew up to its maximum 10.4 in 2005. Then, it shrunk from 6.6 to 6.2 p.p. In addition, the underlying data reveals quite good level of homogeneity of the tax rates. The coefficient of variation appears to be small as is ranging from 0.18 to 0.35. In the group of the old members of the EU, it lies within the interval 0.18-0.23 while in the group of the new members it ranges from 0.18-0.35. In Figure 2 , we can observe that not long after the new members joined the EU in 2004, and in 2007 the old members had to reduce their corporate income tax rate. While the tax rates decreased in general within the EU, the gap between rates in both groups of countries, old EU members and new EU member states, also decreased. Did such a convergence happen because of tax competition?
The dynamics of the corporate tax suggests to test the hypothesis of tax harmonisation. We will make an attempt to observe dynamics of tax competitiveness by evaluating tax competitiveness in 2006, 2013 and 2018, i.e., setting the beginning of the period soon after 10 first new members joined the EU, in 2004.
Choice of criteria and data
There are two broad realms of criteria of tax competitiveness found in the literature. One realm describes how favourable is tax environment in terms of rates or tax burden and is directly related to taxes. Other realm describes how favourable is economic environment of a country in terms of quality of the state tax administration, growth rate, demographic characteristics, the level of remuneration and the level of corruption. Factors within both realms affect decision of management of firms of where to locate or register their businesses. Division of criteria into more specific categories helps to cover all the aspects of evaluation and to comprise a comprehensive set of criteria (Burinskiene, Bielinskas, Podviezko, Gurskiene & Maliene, 2017; Kayali, Saygili & Demirlioglu, 2018; Palevicius, Podviezko, Sivilevicius & Prentkovskis, 2018; . Categories that cover Average "EU15"
Average "EU13"
Average "EU28"
Difference "EU15"-"EU13"
above-mentioned aspects of tax competitiveness are presented in Table 1 : Tax burden; Settlement convenience; Quality of tax system governance; Growth rate; Remuneration of labour; Level of corruption. Two categories are described using two criteria while all remaining ones are described using a single criterion (Podviezko et al., 2019) (Table 1) .
Ten experts with the PhD degree were invited to evaluate importance of the chosen criteria. The experts could be briefly described as follows. Six are employed in the academic field, in finance; two are employed at commercial banks; one is working with a statistical bureau of the government and one is employed at a financial firm. The direct weighing principle was applied with the checking that the sum of weights elicited from each expert is making 100%. The final weights are presented in Table 1 . Values of criteria were collected from the sources described in Table 3 and are presented in Table  2 . In most cases, the data was available for 2006, 2013 and 2018 with some exceptions for Cyprus, Malta and Luxemburg, and for one criterion Labour costs per hour, for which we used available data for 2004 instead of 2006. 
Methodology of evaluation and results
For the evaluation of 28 member countries of the EU, we chosen the multiple criteria evaluation method TOPSIS because of the following reasons: It is a popular method suitable for a great number of fields. Citations, where it was used. Another reason for choosing the TOPSIS method is its reaction to the artificial average alternative with all average values of criteria. The cumulative criterion of the method retrieves 0.5 for such an alternative, and thus can serve as a good measure for the evaluated alternative Podviezko and Podvezko (2014) . In the case of the value of the cumulative criterion of the TOPSIS method is above 0.5, the result could be considered as above average. And contrary, in the case if the value of the cumulative criterion of the TOPSIS method is below 0.5, the result could be considered as below average.
The method uses such a normalisation that transforms each vector belonging to each criterion of m to the vector of the unitary length. There are n coordinates of such vectors, namely values of the apriori chosen criterion for each alternative Aj, where; I ∈ 1,…,n is the number of alternatives, m is the number of alternatives. The method uses formulae of Euclidean distances in the n-dimensional space. The method is described as follows:
Step 1. Construction of the decision-matrix ||Rij|| with values rijof m criteria for n alternatives (or countries; n = 28 in our case).
Step 2. Normalisation of the entries of the decision-matrix has influence on the result of evaluation (Podviezko & Podvezko, 2015) . Nevertheless, as it is embedded in the method (Gusaroviene et al., 2016; Palevicius, Grigonis, Podviezko & Barauskaite, 2016) , there is no choice allowed for normalisation, but the formula (1):
Step 3. Construction of hypothetical best and worst alternatives * j V and − j V as follows:
Where I1is the set of indices of the maximising criteria, I2 is the set of indices of the minimising criteria while ω i . ω1 are weights of criteria presented in Table 1 .
Step 4. The Euclidean distance * j D and − j D correspondingly to the best and the worst hypothetical solutions is calculated as follows:
Step 5. The cumulative criterion * j C of the method TOPSIS or each alternative j is calculated as follows:
From formula (6), it could observed that the smaller is the distance to the best hypothetical alternative and the greater is the distance to the worst hypothetical alternative, the better will be result of the evaluation. The logic of the method is rather transparent as it uses distances in the Euclidean space.
We decided to make the classic relative evaluation of three sets of data for the 28 countries for 2006, 2013 and 2017, in order to grasp competitiveness of countries, which is relative. Contrary, analysis of absolute positions of dynamics of the tax competitiveness absolute evaluation (Ginevicius, Podvezko & Podviezko, 2012) could be used in the future for achieving tax harmonisation in the EU. In the case of absolute evaluation, the cumulative criterion of the TOPSIS method would not change in case if country's tax environment does not change as it may happen with the relative evaluation. For the absolute evaluation, the same TOPSIS method is used, but with invariant hypothetic alternatives for the whole range of years Podviezko & Podvezko, 2014) . The absolute evaluation would, in fact, reveal not the state of each country in terms of its competitiveness, but its absolute score of tax competitiveness.
The results of the relative evaluation of the tax competitiveness of the 28 countries of the EU are presented in Table 4 . Average ranks for the EU-15 countries appear to be as follows: 16.27 in 2006; 15.73 in 2013 and 17.4 in 2017 while average ranks for the EU-13 countries are: 12.46 in 2006; 13.08 in 2013 and 11.15 in 2017. We note that differences between the average ranks became larger in 2017: some EU-13 countries decided to create a more favourable environment for investors. Croatia shifted from the 25th place to the 8th place; Czech Republic reinstated its high rank 9 in 2017; Romania sustains its tax competitiveness from 2013 with ranks 6-7; Slovenia achieved a rather high 13th position in 2017.
Nevertheless, the tax competitiveness in both groups of countries, EU-13 (new members) and EU-15 (old members), is far from being uniform. In Figure 3 , ranks of countries in both groups are presented: new members are put to the left-hand side, while the old members-to the right-hand side. In the graph, we can observe a high degree of spread in the distribution of ranks of the tax competitiveness in the two groups. Only some countries in both groups, especially in EU-13, decided to increase and sustain their tax competitiveness. 
Conclusion
There is a trade-off between tax harmonisation and tax competition. Some negative effects of tax competition were revealed in the paper, such as smaller budget to GDP ratio, lower supply of positive externalities and emigration. The EU is an environment with many common (harmonised) features as the free trade, the common currency in the majority of countries, similar standards of accountancy and common databases of major economic indicators. Twenty eight member countries of the EU were chosen for testing a hypothesis of tax harmonisation. The hypothesis was suggested by the dynamics of the corporate tax rates as it shows tendencies of convergence of the rates among the countries of the EU.
